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STATE SUPREMACY IN THE FEDERAL REALM: THE 
INTERSTATE COMPACT 
M arlissa S. Briggett* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 24, 1989, the largest oil spill in American history oc-
curred.! The Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground in Prince William 
Sound, spewing 10.9 million gallons of oil for miles. 2 The resulting 
damage to fishing, marine life, and Alaskan tourism was devastat-
ing. 3 The spill also devastated the peace of mind of the nation, 
particularly Alaskan citizens. 4 
The disaster raised the question of whether the spill could have 
been avoided by stronger preventative regulation. 5 An alerted public 
began to scrutinize the regulatory system. 6 Many found it unsatis-
factory.7 Among the areas thought to need improvement are oil 
tanker design, operating requirements, and personnel standards. 8 
• Production Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1990-
1991. 
1 Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 2. 
2 Lee, Tragedy in Alaska Waters, 176 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 260, 260 (1989). 
3 See Johnson, Alaska Governor Says Cancellations Threaten Summer Season, TRAVEL 
WEEKLY, June 22, 1989, at 58; Disturbing Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 15, 
1989, at 14. 
4 "A leather-faced fishermen from the town of Cordova, Mr. Brown finished his sentence 
while choking back tears. 'We had a pristine environment,' he said. 'What we've got now, 
well, it's a loss of innocence.''' Shabecoff, Valdez Townspeople Angered as Oil Slick Continues 
to Expand Off Alaska, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1989, at 8, col. 1. 
5 See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, OCEANIC SOCIETY, 
STATEMENT BY CLIFTON CURTIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE OCEANIC SOCIETY, TO 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 7 (1989). 
6 See id. 
7 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (Oil Tanker Navigation Safety 
Act of 1989, report submitted by Senator Hollings). 
8 See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, OCEANIC SOCIETY, 
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In the past, the Pacific coastal states had tried to promulgate 
stricter regulations. 9 Congress, however, has delegated authority to 
the Coast Guard to promulgate oil transportation regulations. 10 From 
Alaska's perspective, there are two reasons why this delegation of 
authority is unsatisfactory. First, Alaska and other coastal states 
that shoulder the burden of oil spills have no formal voice in artic-
ulating standards to prevent the occurrence of future spills. Second, 
the Coast Guard seems susceptible to the powerful interests of the 
oil tanker trade. 11 
Alaska is in no position to change the unsatisfactory system now 
in place, however. The first proscription to unilateral action by 
Alaska lies in the supremacy clause, which preempts state action in 
an area where the federal government has acted. 12 Even barring the 
IMPERATIVES FOR PROTECTION BY THE u.s. CONGRESS AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 5 
(1989). 
[d. 
[l]mprovements for tankers should include double-bottoms, additional segregated 
ballast tanks, and/or bow thrusters for enhanced maneuverability; tanker size re-
strictions linked to effective worst-ease-spill cleanup capability; upgraded vessel 
traffic service (VTS) in Prince William Sound and other U.S. ports .... Preventive 
measures involving personnel that need to be strengthened include: adequacy of 
license requirements; improved retraining and refresher courses; monitoring for 
alcohol and drug abuse on the job; increased civil fines and criminal punishments; and 
additional manning requirements. 
9 See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co., the Supreme Court held that, if a Washington state tanker law imposes stricter standards 
for design and construction of tankers than the national standards, that law is invalid under 
the supremacy clause. See id. at 168. 
10 See 33 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988). 
11 See H. Bader, R. Johnson, Z. Plater & A. Reiser, Potential Utility of an Interstate 
Compact as a Vehicle for Oil Spill Prevention and Response 17 (Dec. 13, 1989) (unpublished 
legal research report for. the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission on file at the offices of 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review) [hereinafter Interstate Compact Report]. 
[d. 
The Coast Guard routinely approved reductions in the number of sailors required on 
oil tankers, as well as reducing the level of experience for tanker operations. Pilotage 
standards for Prince William Sound were lowered to meet nationwide general stan-
dards. It appears that Coast Guard decision making is driven by industry initiative, 
rather than agency fact finding. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 
This Constitution and the Laws ofthe United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. 
[d. The Supreme Court generally finds state laws preempted where a federal regulatory 
scheme exists. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (when a 
state asserts the right to act upon a matter regulated by the United States Warehouse Act, 
the federal scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than 
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preemption problem, Alaska's resources, financial and otherwise, are 
not equal to the task of regulating the oil-shipping trade. 13 
An interstate compact is a binding agreement between two or 
more states14 that may provide Alaska with a powerful tool to vin-
dicate its interests. The interstate compact has been recognized as 
a valuable intermediate level of regulation between intrusive federal 
control and ineffective state control. 15 Regional control potentially 
offers more efficiency than federal control. 16 Because regions are 
more familiar than Washington with the particular circumstances of 
a regional problem, they are more sensitive to the type of regulations 
required. 17 Furthermore, because the states have a greater interest 
in the outcome of the regulations, it is in their best interests to 
regulate as effectively as possible. For instance, Alaska, Washing-
ton, and Oregon are very dependent upon Pacific coastal waters for 
their marine and ecological life, as well as for their fishing and 
tourism industries. 18 The states' common dependency should ensure 
adequacy of regulation. 
If Alaska bands together with other states, it can create an inter-
state compact agency with authority to promUlgate oil transportation 
regulations. This interstate compact would become federal law upon 
congressional approval. 19 Thus, as federal law, the interstate com-
pact accomplishes what the states acting alone cannot accomplish. 20 
The new interstate compact agency, therefore, would circumvent 
the current inadequate Coast Guard regulations. Furthermore, 
Alaska would be able to pool its resources, including personnel, 
equipment, financing, and expertise, with the other compacting 
states, and perhaps the federal government, thus eliminating the 
that of the state). But see Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444-
46 (1960) (although federal statutes comprehensively regulate safety of ships and shipping in 
interstate commerce, local jurisdictions may enact shipping regulations to protect the health 
and welfare of citizens). 
13 See Interstate Compact Report, supra note 11, at 8. 
14 See generally Note, The Interstate Compact-A Survey, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 320 (1954). 
15 Comment, Using the Interstate Compact to Control Acid Deposition, 6 J. ENERGY L. & 
POL'y 413, 446 (1985). 
16 A compact can be highly responsive to community needs and values because citizens 
easily can access the compact representatives appointed by the governor. This responsiveness 
leads to decisions that are narrowly tailored to the needs of the region and are therefore more 
effective and efficient than generalized federal policy decisions. See Interstate Compact Re-
port, supra note 11, at 7. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. at 16. 
19 See infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. 
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problem of Alaska's lack of resources. 21 Another source of revenue 
may come from the establishment of fees for crude oil shipped across 
members' territory.22 The interstate compact, then, presents a pow-
erful tool to regulate interstate oil transportation more effectively. 
This Comment argues that an interstate compact can circumvent 
existing federal regulations. Section II addresses the importance of 
Alaska's coastal waters to the state's uniqueness and the inadequacy 
of present regulations to protect these waters. Section III deals with 
the basic development of the interstate compact, beginning with the 
origins of the interstate compact and describing the gradual expan-
sion of the compact clause. Then, section III describes the interstate 
compact in operation. Section IV studies the constitutionality of an 
interstate compact that directly conflicts with prior federal law. 
Finally, section V presents the particular applicability of an inter-
state compact to Alaska's situation. 
II. THE THREAT OF AN OIL SPILL TO ALASKA'S UNIQUENESS 
A. Oil Spill Effects on Alaska 
From the Aleutian word meaning "great land," Alaska reflects its 
name. 23 Great in beauty, in size, and in natural resources, Alaska is 
America's last frontier.24 The abundant natural resources within 
Alaska evoke reverence from environmentalists and developers 
alike. 25 The Exxon Valdez spill brought to the forefront the tension 
between these two groupS.26 
The oil spill affected many facets of Alaskan life. The fishing 
industry, which provides nearly 20,000 jobs and annual catches of 
over two billion dollars in wholesale value,27 is obviously affected by 
an oil spill. The danger from contaminated fish led state officials to 
cancel the years' herring season, which would have brought in an 
estimated twelve million dollars in revenue. 28 Furthermore, the spill 
also threatened the psyche of the fisherman. 29 When Exxon compen-
sated the fishermen for their loss in earnings due to the spill, the 
21 Interstate Compact Report, supra note 11, at 8. 
22 ld. at 21. 
23 Lemonick, The Two Alaskas, TIME, Apr. 17, 1989, at 56. 
24 ld. 
25 Adler, Alaska After Exxon, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 1989, at 50, 51. 
26 See Lemonick, supra note 23, at 56-57. 
27 ld. at 58. 
28 ld. 
29 See Shabecoff, supra note 4, at 8, col. 1. 
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money did not compensate the fishermen for the loss of the actual 
experience of fishing. 30 
In the wake of the oil spill, concern focused also on the tourist 
industry. 31 Seven hundred thousand people, more than the entire 
Alaskan population, travel to Alaska annually to experience the 
unspoiled beauty for which Alaska is famous. 32 Alaska relies on its 
clean image to boost tourism. 33 With at least 2,500 square miles of 
ocean affected by the spill and 300 to 800 miles of stained shoreline, 34 
Alaska's image may be tarnished permanently in potential tourists' 
minds. 
Finally, the spill threatened Alaska's priceless ecology.35 Prince 
William Sound, in particular, is home to sensitive bird species and 
serves as a fundamental migratory path and playground for whales, 
seals, and otters.36 A preliminary beach survey indicated an average 
of eighty oil-coated ducks and other birds per one hundred meters.37 
Bald eagles scavenging the contaminated birds were at risk. 38 Sig-
nificant numbers of deer and otters were also harmed. 39 
B. The Inadequacy of Present Regulations 
The Exxon Valdez spill educated the nation about Alaska's unique 
environment. 4o It also focused public attention on the present oil 
transportation regulatory system. 41 In particular, the public heavily 
scrutinized the Coast Guard's role in oil transportation. 42 
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 gave the Coast Guard 
the authority to control vessel traffic and set the standards for oil 
tanker design, construction, maintenance, and operation.43 Prior to 
this legislation, the primary mission of the Coast Guard was search 
and rescue operations.44 The two responsibilities are not comple-
30 See id. 
31 See Johnson, supra note 3, at 58. 
32 See Lemonick, supra note 23, at 58. 
33 Hamel & Schreiner, Selling Alaska's Pride, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 1989, at 60. 
34 Disturbing Numbers, supra note 23, at 14. 
35 Curtis, supra note 5, at 5. 
36 Id. 
37 Lemonick, supra note 23, at 58. 
38 Id. 
39 Disturbing Numbers, supra note 3, at 14. 
40 See Adler, supra note 25, at 50. 
41 Curtis, supra note 5, at 7. 
42 See, e.g., 135 CONGo REC. E1347 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1989). 
43 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1988). 
44 135 CONGo REC. E1349 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1989) (reprinting Fradkin, The Valdez Con-
nection, AUDUBON MAG. (1977». 
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mentary, and the history of the Coast Guard's involvement in the 
regulatory scheme reveals some doubt as to whether the Coast 
Guard should be regulating the oil industry. 45 
In 1973, before any regulations were proposed, Secretary of the 
Interior Roger C.B. Morton assured Congress that "[n]ewly con-
structed American flag vessels carrying oil from Port Valdez to 
United States ports will be required to have segregated ballast 
systems, incorporating double bottoms. "46 The Coast Guard formu-
lated this postion for the United States delegation to the Intergov-
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (1M CO) conference 
in London in 1973. Yet the United States's position was defeated 
overwhelmingly at the conference. One participant blamed the Coast 
Guard's lack of forcefulness at the conference for the defeat. 47 Al-
though the IMCO's position was not binding on the United States, 
the Coast Guard insisted that it could not impose stricter require-
ments than those of the conference. 48 The regulations that were 
proposed reflected the results of the conference, rather than the 
stronger regulations that the United States originally had presented 
at the conference. 49 
The proposed regulations were greeted with criticism. Environ-
mental organizations pointed out that the American Petroleum In-
stitute organized the study group that developed the proposed reg-
ulations. 50 There was discord even within the administration. The 
Secretary of the Interior and the Environmental Protection Agency 
both expressed dissatisfaction with the regulations. 51 
Complaints persist that the Coast Guard is too close to the regu-
lated industry to regulate effectively. 52 Yet, because of the expertise 
and strong bonds between industry and the Coast Guard, it is diffi-
45 See id. 
46 [d. 
47 [d. 
48 [d. Senator Magnuson wrote to the Transportation Secretary that he was concerned 
that: 
[d. 
[Tlhe rules were developed in a manner that relied too heavily on the input of special 
interests . . . the Coast Guard has accepted-on a political rather than a technical 
basis-the provisions of the 1973 IMCO conference as the basis of its regulatory 
actions. The Coast Guard strained to stay within the letter of a treaty which had not 
been sent to the Senate for advice and consent, which is not intended to be exclusive, 
and which does not cover completely the problem of accidental pollution from ships. 
49 [d. 
50 [d. 
51 [d. 
52 [d. at E1347. 
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cult for other federal agencies, coastal states, and environmental 
groups to assert themselves in the oil tanker transportation field. 53 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT INTO A 
POWERFUL TOOL TO DEAL WITH COMPLEX REGIONAL PROBLEMS 
A. Constitutional Roots of the Interstate Compact Device 
Authority for interstate compacts emanates from the United 
States Constitution. 54 The grant of power to the states to enter into 
agreements, known as the compact clause, is a significant one. 55 
Originally, however, the states perceived the compact clause pri-
marily as a device to determine boundary disputes. 56 Gradually, the 
states began to recognize in the compact clause a tool for the reso-
lution of other, more complex, problems. For example, in 1917, the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey established an inter-
state commission to administer efficiently a multitudinous array of 
issues that confronted the Port of New York. 57 The federal govern-
ment, the repository of power over interstate commerce, ceded to 
the Port Authority the power to regulate a harbor of vital commer-
cial importance to the entire country. 58 
Observation of the potential power of an interstate compact has 
led Congress to pay increased attention to interstate compacts. 59 In 
certain areas, however, CongTess has yielded its supervisory pow-
ers. In Virginia v. Tennessee,60 the Supreme Court distinguished 
53 Id. at E1348-49. 
54 u.s. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact 
with another State . . . ." I d. 
55 See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Inter-
state Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 691 n.25 (1925) [hereinafter Frankfurter & Landis]. 
The authors argue that the full potential of the compact clause has not yet been realized 
because, phrased as a negative limitation in the Constitution, the significance of the grant of 
power has been minimized. 
56 See id. at 692--93. 
57 Note, Congressional Supervision of Interstate Compacts, 75 YALE L.J. 1416 (1966). 
Originally granted powers to build, operate, and coordinate transportation facilities, the Port 
Authority, representing New York and New Jersey, has even greater power now. The Au-
thority borrows and issues bonds to raise capital funds, budgets its revenue, enters into 
contracts without legislative approval, and issues subpoenas. In addition, it operates, rents, 
builds, and buys office buildings, railroad lines, and warehouse facilities. Id. at 1419. For text 
of the Port Authority Compact, see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-1 to 32:1-174 (West 1963). 
58 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 55, at 697. 
59 See Hines, Nor any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part II: 
Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IOWA L. REV. 432, 443-44 (1966). 
60 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
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between compacts that do not encroach upon federal power and those 
that might interfere with federal power.61 The Court implied that 
compacts not encroaching upon federal power need not obtain 
congressional consent. 62 Congress implicitly recognized the Virginia 
v. Tennessee rule when a debate ensued on the floor over whether 
the Southern Regional Education Compact needed congressional 
consent even though it did not encroach upon federal power.63 The 
debate was never concluded, and the compact continued without 
express congressional ratification, implying that Congress ratified 
its operation. 64 
The problem with the Virginia v. Tennessee rule is its uncertainty 
of application. It does not resolve the question of whether an inter-
state compact should be submitted for congressional consent. 65 To 
apply the test, courts look to the degree to which the compact 
conflicts with federal law or federal interests.66 If there is any danger 
of federal preemption, proponents often consider seeking congres-
sional consent. 67 If a compact clearly preempts or conflicts with 
federal law, then congressional consent is imperative. 68 
B. The Expansion of the Compact Clause 
The formation of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
piqued interest in the interstate compact as an effective device for 
regulation. 69 In 1925, Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis pro-
vided further encouragement for the formation of interstate com-
pacts in their landmark study of the compact clause. 7o Frankfurter 
and Landis argued that the rapid industrialization of the nation 
occasioned a need for creative alternatives to cope with diverse 
interstate interests.71 Industrialization created regional problems 
61 See id. at 519. 
62 See id. at 519, 521; accord, United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 
U.S. 452, 471 (1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1976). 
63 F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 21 
n.8 (1961). 
64 See id. 
66 Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a 
Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63, 70-71 (1965). 
66 See, e.g., United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 472-76; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 
519-21 (1893). 
67 F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 63, at 23. 
66 Id. 
69 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
70 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 55, at 687-88. 
71 Id. at 688. Conservation of natural resources is an area particularly fertile for interstate 
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wholly unsuited to federal control. 72 At the same time, these regional 
matters extended beyond state lines and therefore required a mech-
anism of control greater than that at the disposal of a single state. 73 
The interstate compact agency provided such a mechanism. 
Once a compact obtains congressional approval, administrators 
may possess the power to promulgate implementing rules and reg-
ulations. 74 They may even go so far as to direct federal agencies. 
Seattle Master Builders Association v. Pacific Northwest Electric 
Power & Conservation Planning Counci[75 involved the Bonneville 
Power Administration (BPA), an agency of the United States De-
partment of Energy, and the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and 
Conservation Planning Council, an interstate compact agency.76 The 
Act77 creating the Council provided that certain BP A actions must 
be consistent with the Council's plan. 78 The Act also directed that 
the Council can request and review certain actions of the federal 
agency.79 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
delegation of that power over a federal agency to an interstate 
agency. 80 
Although not involving an interstate compact, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in California v. Environmental Protec-
agreements. I d. at 699-703. Accordingly, there has been an increasing use of compacts in the 
field of environmental regulations. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 23-53 (1975 & Supp. 1989) 
(Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-4-2.2 (Burns 
1981) (Interstate Mining Compact encouraging conservation measures and fostering mineral 
and natural resource development); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1201-1224 (1984) (New Hamp-
shire-Vermont Interstate Sewage and Waste Disposal Facilities Compact). 
72 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 55, at 707-08. "National action is either unavailable 
or excessive ... and, in the practical tasks of government, wholly unsuited to Federal action 
even if constitutional power were obtained." Id. 
73 Id. at 707. 
74 F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 63, at 5. Compact agencies also may 
request and review federal agency action. See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific North-
west Elec. Power, 786 F.2d 1359, 1362 (9th Cir. 1986). Some compacts, however, form 
commissions primarily in a study and recommendatory capacity. These commissions investi-
gate issues, make recommendations to the constituent states, and perhaps publicize their 
findings to persuade the proper officials to act. In theory, these compacts are the least 
powerful; in practice, however, they may wield tremendous influence and tend to be broader 
in scope than the operating ones. See R. LEACH & R. SUGG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 18-19 (1959); see also F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 
63, at 45; Leach, The Interstate Oil Compact: A Study of Success, 10 OKLA. L. REV. 274, 
287-88 (1957). . 
75 786 F.2d 1359, 1362 (9th Cir. 1986). 
76 Id. 
77 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1988). 
78 786 F.2d at 1362. 
7' Id. 
80 I d. at 1364. 
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tion Agency81 recognized that Congress can delegate to a state pow-
ers otherwise reserved to the federal government.82 In this case, 
California and Washington challenged the Environmental Protection 
Agency Administrator's determination that exempted federal agen-
cies from compliance with the states' proposed permit plans. The 
court of appeals examined the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 (FWPCAA)83 to determine whether the 
FWPCAA had waived exclusive federal jurisdiction to issue permits 
to federal agencies.84 Having found the claimed waiver in the 
FWPCAA, the court of appeals held that the waiver was proper 
because it was clear, unambiguous, and not unduly broad or irrev-
ocable. 85 The result required the federal agencies to comply with 
both substantive and procedural requirements of state pollution con-
trol permit programs. 86 
C. Judicial Receptiveness to the Interstate Compact 
The Supreme Court has encouraged the expanded use and 
increased powers of the interstate compact. 87 In New York v. 
New Jersey88 New York brought suit to enjoin a New Jersey state 
agency from implementing aproject that would have conveyed 
sewage from the Passaic Valley into part of N ew York Harbor. 89 
Although the Court ruled that the evidence presented was in-
sufficient to grant injunctive relief, the Court suggested coopera-
tive study and mutual concession by the states. 90 By doing so, 
81 511 F.2d 963, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 200 (1976). 
82 Id. 
83 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988). 
84 See 511 F.2d at 968. 
85 Id. at 964-65. 
86 Id. at 974-75. 
B7 E.g., State v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951) (discussed infra notes 92-95 and accompanying 
text); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921) (discussed infra notes 88-90 and 
accompanying text); see also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 55, at 696; Hirsch & Abra-
movitz, Clearing the Air: Some Legal Aspects of Interstate Air Pollution Problems, 18 DUQ. 
L. REV. 53, 102 (1979). Because cases considering interstate compact issues have been rela-
tively few, however, there is a paucity of significant interstate compact law. Engdahl, Inter-
state Urban Areas and Interstate "Agreements" and "Compacts," Unclear Possibilities, 58 
GEO. L.J. 799, 803 (1970). 
88 256 U.S. 296 (1921). 
89 Id. at 298. 
90 Id. at 313. 
We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration of this case, that 
the grave problem of sewage disposal presented ... is one more likely to be wisely 
solved by co-operative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of 
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the Court advocated the formation of a type of interstate compact 
agency. 91 
The Court has manifested its approval of interstate compacts in 
other decisions as well. In State v. Sims92 the issue before the Court 
was whether the West Virginia legislature had the authority, under 
its state Constitution, to enter into a compact that delegated power 
to an interstate agency and appropriated funds for the administrative 
expenses of the agency.93 The Court avoided a strict reading of the 
state Constitution in order to sustain the compact. 94 Because the 
Court went to such lengths to sustain the compact, the decision 
indicates that compacts will be sustained whenever possible. 95 
In United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission96 the 
Supreme Court reviewed an interstate tax compact to determine 
whether the agreement, which lacked congressional consent, was 
valid under the compact clause. 97 The purpose of the compact was 
to facilitate the determination of tax liability for multi state taxpayers 
and to promote uniformity in state tax systems. 98 The Court con-
cluded that congressional consent was unnecessary because the com-
pact did not authorize states to exercise any powers that they could 
not have exercised in the absence of the compact. 99 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has invested congressionally 
sanctioned interstate compacts with additional weight by recognizing 
them as federal law. 100 The "law of the Union doctrine,"lOl that is, 
Id. 
representatives of the states so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any 
court however constituted. 
91 See id. 
92 341 U.S. 22 (1951). 
93 Id. at 30. 
94 Although article X, § 4 of the West Virginia Constitution forbids the use of debt except 
in certain enumerated situations, the Court read the constitution broadly to find that provisions 
in the Compact regarding debt were sufficient to avoid conflict with article X, § 4. Id. at 32. 
These provisions included the requirement of the governor's approval of the budget and the 
pledging of credit only by and with the authority of the state legislature. Id. 
95 Note, The Interstate Compact-A Survey, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 320, 329 (1953). 
96 434 U.S. 452 (1978). 
97 Id. at 454. 
98 Id. at 456. 
99 Id. at 473. 
100 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1980); see also Petty v. Tennessee-Mississippi 
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959); Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. 
Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427 (1940); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 
(13 How.) 518, 565-66 (1852); see also Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts: A 
Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REV. 987, 992--93 (1965); Hines, supra note 59, at 
445. 
101 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,566 (1852); see 
also Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 442 (Interstate Agreement on Detainers was a congressionally 
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interstate compact as federal law, originated in Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge CO.102 In this case, a bridge construction 
company unsuccessfully argued that state legislative authorization 
shielded it from a nuisance suit.103 The company reasoned that until 
a specific congressional act prohibited obstructions on the Ohio 
River, the state had a right to exercise its own discretion.104 The 
Court, however, found that a clause in the congressionally sanctioned 
Virginia-Kentucky Compact of 1789, providing for free and common 
use and navigation of the Ohio River, was controlling because the 
compact became a law of the Union by congressional sanction. 105 
The Court has not always followed the law of the Union doctrine. 
In New York v. Central Railroad,106 New York State made a claim 
against the railroad based upon the construction of a compact be-
tween N ew York and New Jersey. 107 When the state courts ruled in 
favor of the railroad, N ew York attempted to bring the case before 
the Supreme Court by securing a writ of error. 108 A unanimous Court 
dismissed the writ because the question arose under the agreement 
and not under any act of Congress. 109 In contrast to Wheeling, the 
Court determined that congressional assent did not transform the 
act into federal law. 110 
Although Central Railroad never addressed the law of the Union 
doctrine espoused by Wheeling, one subsequent Supreme Court de-
cision cited Central Railroad as a repUdiation of the doctrine. 111 In 
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch CO.,112 the 
Court declined jurisdiction over a compact apportioning water rights 
of an interstate stream. 113 The Court relied on Central Railroad to 
find that the compact was not a treaty or statute of the United 
sanctioned interstate compact whose interpretation presents a question of federal law); Intake 
Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293, 296-97 (1983) (because 
of congressional consent, Compact article requiring unanimous consent of signatory states 
before transfer of interbasin water was immune from commerce clause attacks). 
102 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 566 (1852). 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at 565. 
105 See id. at 566. 
106 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455 (1870). 
107 I d. at 456. 
108 Id.; see also Engdahl, supra note 100, at 993. 
109 New York v. Central R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 456. 
110 Id. 
111 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
112 Id. 
113 See id. at 109-10. 
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States. 114 Significantly, the Court never addressed the conflicting 
doctrine of Wheeling in Hinderlider. 
Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed the law of the Union doctrine. 
In Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. Colburn,115 the 
Court addressed the discrepancies between Wheeling and Central 
Railroad. 116 The Court overturned the decision in Central Railroad, 
concluding that a compact sanctioned by Congress involved a federal 
law and was therefore reviewable by the Court.117 By reaffirming 
the law of the Union doctrine, the Court validated the underlying 
principle that congressional consent can transform interstate com-
pacts into federallaw.ns Thus, the law of the Union doctrine remains 
controlling, and interstate compacts are given the force and effect 
of federal law. 
D. Cooperative Federalism: The Federal Government's 
Participation in Compacts 
Federal cooperation in interstate compacts offers significant ad-
vantages over pure interstate compacts without such federal partic-
ipation. For instance, an interstate-federal compact offers greater 
financial resources. 119 The federal financing of projects and contri-
bution to the regional compact agency, however, does not necessitate 
federal control over the agency. Rather, the financial resources are 
considered a form of state aid that is not necessarily conditional upon 
advance adherence to federal policies. 120 Therefore, the interstate 
compact retains its independence in substantive matters while sat-
isfying its need for federal resources. 
The federal government offers other non-financial resources as 
well. Some compacts designate federal agencies as primary research 
agencies to gather information. 121 Politically, too, federal participa-
tion proves advantageous. Federal involvement in the drafting of a 
compact may enhance the likelihood of obtaining congressional con-
114 [d. at 109. 
115 310 U.S. 419 (1940). 
116 See id. at 427. 
117 [d. 
118 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,438 n.7 (1980). 
119 Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-operative Federalism, 63 
COLUM. L. REV. 825, 838-39 (1963). 
120 [d. at 839. 
121 [d. at 837. 
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sent. l22 Also, when interstate agreements can affect federal inter-
ests, a federal representative provides the interstate agency with 
an advocate at the federal level who understands the situation. 123 
Furthermore, the federal representative facilitates effective rela-
tions with an array of many-tiered federal agencies. 124 
The Delaware River Basin Compact presents an example of a 
federal-interstate compact. l25 The Compact created a regional 
agency with territorial jurisdiction over the Delaware River Basin 
for the development of water resources through its regulatory and 
administrative powers.126 Five members compose the commission: 
four represent the compacting states, and one represents the federal 
government. 127 A majority is necessary for any agency action. l28 
Because the state representatives have a voice equal to the federal 
representative, there is no danger that the federal government will 
usurp control of the interstate compact. 
In addition, the Constitution implicitly contains proscriptions as 
to how far Congress may interfere with the formation of an interstate 
compact. 129 While playing an important role in the development of 
interstate arrangements, Congress may not establish the essential 
elements of an interstate compact, as this is uniquely within the 
states' responsibility. 130 
Furthermore, there is some judicial reluctance to allow congres-
sional involvement in interstate agreements to go too far. 131 In Tobin 
v. United States,132 the Judiciary Committee initiated an informal 
122 Heron, The Interstate Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action to 
Congressionally Coerced Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 18 (1985). 
123 See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 63, at 18-19. 
124 Id. 
125 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). 
126 Grad, supra note 119, at 825. 
127 Id. at 827. 
128 Id. 
129 See Heron, supra note 122, at 22-23. 
130 Id. at 24-25. A revealing statement of the federal attitude toward interstate compacts 
with federal participation is illustrated in a note from the Director of the United States Bureau 
of the Budget to President Truman: "Several steps can be taken to insure this consideration 
[of federal interests] .... Such steps to protect Federal interests, of course, should not interfere 
in any way with the orderly process of negotiations by the States . . . ." T. WITMER, 
DOCUMENTS ON THE USE AND CONTROL OF THE WATERS OF INTERSTATE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL STREAMS, H.R. Doc. No. 319, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 371-72 (1968). The statement 
suggests the independence of the states' interests. But see Hassett, Enforcement Problems 
in the Air Quality Field: Some Intergovermental Structural Aspects, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63,84 
(1974) (the record suggests that federal agencies will want a supervisory role when there is 
federal participation in an interstate compact). 
131 Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
132 Id. 
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investigation into the N ew York Port Authority.133 The Authority 
refused to disclose certain documents relating exclusively to its in-
ternal administration. l34 The purpose of the subcommittee investi-
gation was to decide whether Congress should alter, amend, or 
repeal its consent to the interstate compact. 135 The appellant, Ex-
ecutive Director of the Port Authority, argued that Congress did 
not have the power under the Constitution to transform its consent 
in such a way.136 The Court sidestepped the constitutional issue by 
holding that Congress adequately could protect federal concerns by 
acting pursuant to its usual plenary powers. 137 
The Court recognized Congress's power to override provisions of 
an interstate compact by subsequent legislation enacted within its 
plenary powers. 138 Perhaps more significant was the Court's hesi-
tancy to hold that Congress has an implied power to alter, amend, 
or repeal its consent to an interstate compact. 139 The Court's hesi-
tancy was based on the fear that such a holding would stir up 
uncertainty in the compacts that already existed at the time. 140 
Thus, the interstate compact has expanded from a device primarily 
determining boundary disputes between states into a device for more 
complex problems. 141 Judicial encouragement of interstate compacts 
furthers their expansion. 142 Federal cooperation in compacts also 
increases potential abilities of interstate compacts. 143 
IV. EXPANSION OF THE COMPACT CLAUSE TO CIRCUMVENT 
PRIOR, INADEQUATE FEDERAL REGULATION 
A. Significance of an Interstate Compact 
The most significant aspect of an interstate compact is that 
congressional consent transforms the compact into federal law. 144 
Upon congressional consent, the interstate compact provides a ve-
hicle for the states to exercise power that is otherwise barred by 
133 See id. at 271. 
134 See id. 
135 [d. at 272. 
136 [d. 
137 See id. at 273. 
138 [d. 
139 [d. 
140 [d. 
141 See supra notes 54-86 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra notes 87-118 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 100-118 and accompanying text. 
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federal preemption. 145 In United States Steel Corporation v. Multis-
tate Tax Commission,146 the Court concluded that congressional con-
sent was unnecessary because the compact did not authorize states 
to exercise powers they could not have exercised in its absence. 147 
The corollary is that consent is necessary when the compact does 
authorize states to exercise powers they could not have exercised 
otherwise. This conclusion implies that with congressional consent, 
the states' sphere of power is increased. 
Yet, the states have never used an interstate compact explicitly 
to circumvent existing federal regulations. There does not seem to 
be any obstacle, however, to using the interstate compact in this 
manner. When the compact becomes federal law upon congressional 
consent, the new federal law supersedes prior federal law just as 
any other new federal law would. 
Unfortunately, subsequent congressional legislation similarly can 
preempt the interstate compact. 148 There is arguably no check on 
Congress's ability to render the regulations of a regional compact 
agency void. 149 The threat of subsequent legislation may represent 
a disincentive to the states involved in an interstate agreement to 
commit money, time, and resources to a regional agency whose 
authority is so completely dependent on Congress. 
Federal participation in an interstate compact,150 may provide a 
safeguard for important state interests, however. With federal par-
ticipation and representation in the regional agency, Congress might 
believe that the federal interests are served adequately so as to 
allow Congress to adopt a more cooperative approach to the com-
pact. 151 
145 Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact, 590 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D. Mont. 1983). 
146 434 U.S. 452 (1978). 
147 [d. at 473. 
148 See Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 589-90 (D. Colo. 1983) 
(congressional approval of interstate compact relating to certain navigable waterways did not 
limit congressional authority thereafter to enact the Clean Water Act, even though the Act 
was inconsistent with the compact). 
149 One writer presents the theory that Congress is bound by principles of quasi-contract, 
supported by dicta in early cases. See White, The Emerging Relationship Between Environ-
mental Regulations and Colorado Water Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 597, 630 (1982). The 
generally accepted view, however, is that "[ilt would arguably be inconsistent with the intent 
of the Framers of the Constitution if congressional approval were construed as limiting, rather 
than preserving, federal powers." [d. at 631. 
160 See supra notes 119-40 and accompanying text. 
151 See Hassett, supra note 130, at 82. 
1991] INTERSTATE COMPACT 767 
B. Benefits of an Interstate Compact 
Beyond enlarging a state's sphere of power, there are other ben-
efits to an interstate compact with federal approval. Removed from 
the state interests, both physically and politically, the federal gov-
ernment is apt to de-emphasize regional concerns. An interstate 
compact combats federal insensitivity toward important state inter-
ests. 152 Similarly, an interstate compact excludes peripheral interests 
that can hamper effective regulatory action. 153 With an interstate 
compact, negotiation is limited to the states involved, thus excluding 
unproductive forces that may exist on a large-scale national level. 154 
Furthermore, negotiation limited to the states directly involved is 
more likely to result in efficient regulation that is tailored to specific 
community needs and values. 155 
A compact also increases an individual state's representational 
power within a given context. 156 For instance, unlike Alaska's voice 
of 3 of 535 votes in the United States Congress,157 Alaska could have 
one voice of only four in a Pacific states compact. 158 This proportion-
ately larger voice allows those states that have special concerns 
about an issue to playa larger role than they would have if the issue 
were left to national control. 
Finally, an interstate compact allows states to pool their resources 
and those of the federal government. 159 These pooled resources may 
represent financial resources as well as personnel, equipment, and 
information. The resources may enable the compact agency to per-
form functions it otherwise could not perform. 
C. The Applicability of an Interstate Compact to Oil Tanker 
Regulation in Alaska and the Pacific Region 
Alaska's situation is ripe for creative application of the compact 
clause. The burden of an oil spill of the Exxon Valdez magnitUde 
152 Bader, supra note 11, at 6. 
153 [d. at 8. 
154 [d. 
155 [d. at 7. 
156 [d. at 6-7. 
157 The United States Congress includes 535 members. 1990-1991 UNITED STATES Gov-
ERNMENT MANUAL 29. Alaska is represented by three members of Congress. See CONGRES-
SIONAL YELLOW BOOK, State Delegations & District Maps, at 2 (Fall 1990). 
158 Interstate Compact Report, supra note 11, at 7. 
159 See supra notes 21-22, 119-21 and accompanying text. 
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falls disproportionately on Alaska and other coastal states in a num-
ber of areas. For example, oil spills threaten the anadromous fish-
eries upon which an extensive aboriginal population depends. l60 The 
fishing industries of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon are dependent 
upon the harvest in Alaskan coastal waters.161 Furthermore, the 
unspoiled coastlines of the Pacific represent a unique ecological set-
ting too valuable to destroy. 162 
Despite the particular sensitivity of Alaska and the other coastal 
states to an oil spill, however, these states are powerless alone to 
try to prevent spills through regulation. Because of the doctrine of 
federal preemption,163 they must remain passive even if the existing 
regulations are inadequate. An interstate compact, however, pro-
vides a way to overcome the problem of federal preemption. 164 
The State of Alaska is considering a variety of possible applications 
for a compact agency.165 For example, a compact agency may regu-
late industry spill prevention and response capability that could 
supersede the fractured planning for spills that is now in place. 166 
Other options include establishing a regional comprehensive plan 
that creates regulations for tanker design, crew size and qualifica-
tions, and mandatory response and navigation equipment. 167 The 
compact would allow review of Coast Guard and other federal agency 
actions to determine whether their conduct is consistent with the 
plan. l68 The formation of an interstate compact to achieve any of 
these goals should allow the Pacific states to assume a more active 
role in regulating oil tanker transportation. 
D. Forming a Pacific States Compact 
After drafting a compact, Alaska must pass the hurdle of obtaining 
congressional assent because formation of a compact to regulate oil 
transportation will affect interstate commerce substantially.169 Given 
160 Interstate Compact Report, supra note 11, at 16. 
161 [d. 
162 [d. 
163 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. 
165 See Interstate Compact Report, supra note 11, at 19-21. 
166 [d. at 20. 
167 [d. at 21. 
168 [d. 
169 See Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293, 297 
(D. Mont. 1983). The Constitution does not specifically require a certain form of consent, so 
congressional consent may be given in several ways. For example, Congress may consent to 
a compact by formal act, by resolution, or by implied consent. Consent may be given in 
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the particulars of Alaska's situation,170 there is a strong case for 
congressional consent.171 The heightened public attention following 
the Exxon Valdez Spill172 may compel Congress to consent to an 
alternative regulatory scheme that is stricter than the existing one. 
Furthermore, there are indications that Congress may be willing 
to relinquish federal power to the states in the context of oil trans-
portation regulations. The tension between federal and state inter-
ests over oil transportation was illustrated in an amendment to the 
Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act offered by Represen-
tative Miller of California. 173 The amendment preserved for the 
states the right to impose requirements and obligations in addition 
to the Act.174 Representative Studds supported the amendment, 
stressing deference to state interests. 175 He emphasized the long 
history of protecting states' rights in environmental protection. 176 In 
response to the argument that allowing states to legislate indepen-
dently would lead to a serious lack of uniformity, Studds countered 
that is is not "our task to make life simple for the oil industry. It is 
our job to ensure that spills do not happen. "177 In the ensuing vote, 
advance of a compact's formation, at the time of formation, or even after years of inaction. 
Prochaska, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compacts, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 
383, 389-90 (1986). 
170 These particulars include: Alaska's great interest in safe oil transportation, its belief in 
the inadequacy of present regulations, the suspicious relationship between the Coast Guard 
and the oil tanker trade, and Alaska's disproportionate burden should another spill occur. See 
supra notes 23--53 and accompanying text. 
171 Congress has withheld consent for compacts in very few cases. F. ZIMMERMANN & M. 
WENDELL, supra note 63, at 24. Furthermore, one commentator has noted that compacts 
that include the following characteristics are routinely ratified by Congress: federal represen-
tation; broad standard-setting, monitoring, and enforcement powers for the agency; and one 
vote for every state. See Hassett, supra note 130, at 71. 
172 Curtis, supra note 5, at 7. 
173 See 135 CONGo REC. H8128-42 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989). 
174 ld. at H8128-29. 
175 ld. at H8129. Congressman Studds stated: 
ld. 
Mr. Chairman, in the consideration of the oil spill liability bill, we have come to a 
crucial point where we are going to have to make a decision about whether we are 
going to have tought [sicllaws against oil spills and whether or not we are going to 
protect the rights of the States to devise systems and to impose penalties and to 
extend liabilities to those who would spill oils in the waters off of their States. 
176 ld. Studds noted that federal preemption heavily favors the industry: "Are the potential 
victims lobbying for preemption? Have you had fishermen calling you every night to ask you 
to preempt States rights? Is it because the average American wants preemption that the only 
newspaper in America on record against the amendment is the Wall Street Journal?" ld. at 
H8130. 
177 ld. at H8133. 
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the House of Representatives supported the amendment with 279 
voting for the amendment and 143 voting against the amendment. 178 
Assuming that a Pacific States compact obtains consent, it may 
have to ward off industry arguments for its invalidation. These 
arguments likely will emphasize the shift in the political balance as 
too significant an encroachment by the states within the federal 
sphere. 179 One commentator argues that an interstate compact sub-
stantially altering the balance of power between the states and 
federal government is a treaty that is absolutely prohibited and that 
cannot be validated, even by Congress. 180 If such an arrangement 
actually encroached upon federal authority, the commentator rea-
sons, it might well be invalidated judicially. 181 
The courts, however, have demonstrated a reluctance to intervene 
in interstate compacts. 182 Furthermore, particularly in the context 
of environmental regulation, the Court has been slow to find preemp-
tion where not explicitly intended by Congress. l83 By granting con-
sent, Congress would authorize the compact agency specifically and 
obviously would not intend preemption by federal regulation. There-
fore, unless Congress conditions consent on conforming to certain 
aspects of existing regulations, the present regulations would not 
limit the scope of a new regional agency. 
E. Supportjor a Pacific States Compact 
The case law repUdiates the argument that the states are en-
croaching too far within the federal sphere when they enter into 
interstate compacts with congressional consent. Since Virginia v. 
Tennessee,l84 case law has distinguished between those compacts 
that encroach within the federal sphere and those that do not en-
croach within the federal sphere. 185 This distinction creates an im-
plied assumption that interstate compacts may encroach within the 
federal sphere, so long as Congress grants consent. The operative 
178 [d. at H8148-49. The amendment passed through the Senate and became law on Aug. 
18, 1990, using language similar to Miller's original language. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). 
179 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 65, at 67-69. 
180 See id. 
181 [d. at 67. 
182 See Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
1&1 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984). 
184 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
185 See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-76 
(1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1976). 
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standard for states in determining whether consent is needed is the 
degree to which the compact may conflict with federal law or the 
doctrine of preemption. 186 The circumvention of existing regulations 
is a logical extension of this operative standard. 
Frankfurter and Landis, who advocate the use of a compact so 
long as there is no existing congressional legislation, implicitly lend 
support to the theory of using the interstate compact to circumvent 
pre-existing, inadequate federal regulations. One of their underlying 
premises is that federal control is used when state control proves 
inferior. 187 Another premise is that practical considerations based on 
the concrete circumstances should dominate the decision on whether 
the state action should reign.l88 If the first premise is false and 
federal control is insufficient or unfair, then resorting to the test of 
the concrete circumstances should ensure fair and adequate regula-
tion. In Alaska's case, consideration of the circumstances should lead 
to the conclusion that regional control would prove superior to na-
tional control. 189 
Furthermore, the requirement of congressional approval provides 
the check to the states assuming too much power. Another check 
comes from Congress's ability to act subsequently in the subject 
matter of the compact and thereby supersede the compact. l90 Al-
though a compact agency would not want Congress to exercise its 
right to legislate subsequently, the fact that the right exists lends 
support to the argument that an interstate compact is constitution-
ally valid because there is no danger of unfettered state power. 
Finally, a Pacific states compact regulating oil transportation 
would not conflict with federal policy. The purpose of either federal 
regulations or a regional agency's regulation is the same: to prevent 
oil spillage and to facilitate cleanup.191 Because the ultimate goals of 
both the federal and state governments are the same, an interstate 
186 See United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 471 ("[tlhe relevant inquiry must be one of 
impact on our federal structure"). 
187 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 55, at 724. 
Frequently, it appears that, while a State may deal with a subject that is part of 
interstate commerce, it has in fact dealt with it unfairly or imposed an unreasonable 
burden upon commerce beyond the State line. Again, conditions change and the 
inadequacy of State regulation provokes exercise of the Federal power. 
Id. at 723-24. 
188 See id. at 724-27. 
189 See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text. 
190 Dutton, Compacts and Trade Barrier Controversies, 16 IND. L.J. 204, 211 (1940). 
191 For example, the statement of policy of the Ports and Waterways Safety Program 
declares that navigation and vessel safety and protection of the environment are matters of 
major national importance. 33 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (1988). 
772 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:751 
compact to regulate oil transportation should not disrupt national 
interests and policies. Rather, it may be the most effective way to 
realize these interests and policies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Great concern over the failure of the regulatory system in pre-
venting the Exxon Valdez spill makes it imperative to formulate a 
more stringent and effective system to prevent future tragedies. 
Dissatisfied with the Coast Guard's present regulations, the State 
of Alaska would like to participate more fully in promulgating reg-
ulations regarding oil transportation. Because of the supremacy 
clause, however, Alaska is barred from action within this sphere. 
Even without this bar, Alaska's resources probably are not adequate 
to ensure complete and effective regulation and supervision. 
An interstate compact will prevent problems of preemption and 
lack of resources. Assuming a compact obtains congressional assent, 
preemption will not be a problem because the congressional assent 
would make it federal law. Combining the resources of the states 
and the federal government upon the formation of the compact will 
prevent the problem of lack of resources. 
Once an interstate compact is in place, a commission formed under 
the compact could promulgate rules and regulations concerning oil 
transportation. Given the important state interests involved, it is 
likely that the compact commission would promulgate efficient and 
effective regulations. With such a system in place, the states most 
at risk will have the ability to see to it that the Exxon Valdez spill 
becomes an unrepeated memory. 
